

تحليل الخطاب

Discourse analysis

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جوال المقرر :

Office Hours:

Definitions Introductory & First Lecture

1. definitions. It is difficult to give a single definition of discourse analysis.
- 2-Discourse analysis will enable to reveal the hidden motivations behind a text or behind the choice of a particular method of research to interpret that text
- 3- Discourse analysis is meant to provide a higher awareness of the hidden motivations in others and in ourselves, and therefore, enable us to solve concrete problem by making us ask ontological and epistemological questions.
- 4- Though critical thinking about the analysis of texts is as ancient as mankind, discourse analysis is perceived as the product of postmodern period
- 5- Discourse Analysis (DA) is a modern discipline of the social sciences that covers a wide variety of different sociolinguistic approaches.

It aims to study and analyse the use of discourse in at least one of the three ways stated above, and more often than not, all of them at once.

Analysis of discourse looks not only at the basic level of what is said, but takes into consideration the surrounding social and historical contexts

6 - Making the distinction between whether a person is described as a 'colonization' or a 'occupation' is something DA would look at, whilst considering the implications of each term. To expand, 'occupation' is a term that brings negative connotations of evil and damaging, whereas 'colonization' has positive connotations of helping others to develop themselves. So, one term is looked upon a lot more favourably than the other, and this is what a Discourse Analyst would consider, as well as looking at the relationship of these terms with a widely used term.' Discourse analysts will look at any given text, and this just means anything that communicates a message, and particularly, how that message constructs a social reality or view of the world

Second & Third lecture

1. Language has a magical property: when we speak or write we craft what we have to say to *fit* the situation or context in which we are communicating . But ‘ at the same time, how we speak or write *creates* that very situation or context .It seems, then ‘ that we fit our language to a situation or context that our language, in turn ‘helped to create in the first place

2.This is rather like the “chicken and egg ”question: Which comes first ?The situation we’re in (e. g . a committee meeting ? (Or the language we use (our committee ways of talking and interacting ?(Is this a “committee meeting ”*because* we are speaking and acting this way, or are we speaking and acting this way *because* this is a committee meeting ? After all, if we did not speak and act in certain ways ‘committees could not exist; but then, if institutions, committees, and committee meetings didn’t already exist, speaking and acting this way would be nonsense .

3.Discourses and social languages

Whenever we speak or write, we always and simultaneously construct or build six things or six areas of “reality:”

1.The meaning and value of aspects of the material world : I enter a plain‘ square room, and speak and act in a certain way (e. g .like someone about to run a meeting), and, low and behold, where I sit becomes the “front” of the room .

2- Activities : We talk and act in one way and we are engaged in formally opening a committee meeting; we talk and act in another way and we are engaged in “chit-chat ”before the official start of the meeting.

3-Identities and relationships : I talk and act in one way one moment and I am speaking and acting as “chair” of the committee; the next moment I speak and talk in a different way and I am speaking and acting as one peer/colleague speaking to another .

4. Politics (the distribution of social goods : (I talk and act in such a way that a visibly angry male in a committee meeting (perhaps it’s me!) is “standing his ground on principle,” but a visibly angry female is “hysterical ”.

5.Connections : I talk and act so as to make what I am saying here and now in this committee meeting about whether we should admit more minority students connected to or relevant to (or, on the other hand, not connected to or relevant to) what I said last week about my fears of losing my job given the new government’s turn to the right .

6.Semiotics (what and how different symbol systems and different forms of knowledge “count : (”I talk and act so as to make the knowledge and language of lawyers relevant (privileged), or not, over “everyday language” or over “non-lawyerly academic language” in our committee discussion of facilitating the admission of more minority students .

-- there are several “tools of inquiry) ”ways of looking at the world of talk and interaction) that will help us study how these building tasks are carried out and with what social and political consequences . The tools of inquiry that will be introduced in this chapter are primarily relevant to how we (together with others) build identities and activities and recognize the identities and activities that are being built around us .However ‘the tools of inquiry introduced here are most certainly caught up with all the other building tasks above, as well, as we will see progressively in this book .The tools to be discussed in this chapter are :

a“ .Situated identities ”‘ that is, different identities or social positions we enact and recognize in different settings .

b“ .Social languages ”‘ that is, different styles of language that we use to enact and recognize different identities in different settings ‘ different social languages also allow us to engage in all the other building tasks above (in different ways, building different sorts of things) .

c“ .Discourses ” with a capital “D,” that is, different ways in which we humans integrate language with non-language “stuff,” such as different ways of thinking, acting, interacting, valuing, feeling, believing ‘and using symbols tools, and objects in the right places and at the right times so as to enact and recognize different identities and activities, give the material world certain meanings, distribute social goods in a certain way, make certain sorts of meaningful connections in our experience, and privilege certain symbol systems and ways of knowing over others (i. e .carry out all the building tasks above) .

d“ .Conversations ” with a capital “C,” that is ‘long-running and important themes or motifs that have been the focus of a variety of different texts and interactions (in different social languages and Discourses) through a significant stretch of time and across an array of institutions .

Fourth lecture

2.2 *Who's and what's*

1- When you speak or write anything, you use the resources of English to project yourself as a certain kind of person, a different kind in different circumstances.

You also project yourself as engaged in a certain kind of activity, a different kind in different circumstances. If I have no idea who you are and what you are doing, then I cannot make sense of what you have said, written, or done. You project a different identity at a formal dinner party than you do at the family dinner table. And, though these are both dinner, they are none the less different activities. The fact that people have differential access to different identities and activities, connected to different sorts of status and social goods, is a root source of inequality in society. Intervening in such matters can be a contribution to social justice. Since different identities and activities are enacted in and through language, the study of language is integrally connected to matters of equity and justice.

2- An oral or written “utterance” has meaning, then, only if and when it communicates a *who* and a *what* (Wieder and Pratt 1990a). What I mean by a “who” is a *socially-situated identity*, the “kind of person” one is seeking to be and enact here and now. What I mean by a “what” is a socially-situated *activity* that the utterance helps to constitute.

3- Lots of interesting complications can set in when we think about identity enacted in and through language. *Who's* can be multiple and

they need not always be people. The President's Press Secretary can issue an utterance that is, in fact, authored by a speech writer and authorized (and even claimed) by the President. In this case, the utterance communicates a sort of overlapping and compound *who*. The Press Secretary, even if she is directly quoting the speech writer, must inflect the remark

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with her own voice. In turn, the speech writer is both "mimicking" the President's "voice" and creating an identity for him.

Not just individuals, but also institutions, through the "anonymous" texts and products they circulate, can author or issue "utterances."

For example, we will see below that the warning on an aspirin bottle actually communicates multiple *whos*.

5- An utterance can be authored, authorized by, or issued by a group or a single individual.

Finally, we can point out that *whos* and *whats* are not really discrete and separable.

You are *who* you are partly through *what* you are doing and *what* you are doing is partly recognized for what it is by *who* is doing it. So it is better, in fact, to say that utterances communicate an integrated, though often multiple or "heteroglossic,"

who-doing-what

lecture five

2.3 “Real Indians”

1- Though I have focused on language, it is important to see that making visible and recognizable *who* we are and *what* we are doing always requires more than language. It requires, as well, that we act, think, value, and interact in ways that together with language render *who* we are and *what* we are doing recognizable to others (and ourselves). In fact, to be a particular *who* and to pull off a particular *what* requires that we act, value, interact, and use language *in sync with* or *in coordination with* other people and with various objects (“props”) in appropriate locations and at appropriate times.

2- To see this wider notion of language as integrated with “other stuff” (other people, objects, values, times and places), we will briefly consider Wieder and Pratt’s (1990a, b) fascinating work on how Native Americans (from a variety of different groups, though no claim is made that the following is true of all Native American groups) recognize each other as “really Indian.” Wieder and Pratt point out that real Indians “refer to persons who are ‘really Indian’ in just those words with regularity and standardization” (1990a: 48). Wieder and Pratt’s work will also make clear how the identities (the *whos*) we take on are flexibly negotiated in actual contexts of practice.

3-The term “real Indian” is, of course, an “insiders’ term.” The fact that it is used by some Native Americans in enacting their own identity work does not license non- Native Americans to use the term.

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4-The problem of “recognition and being recognized” is very consequential and problematic for Native Americans. While in order to be considered a “real Indian,” one must be able to make some claims to kinship with others who are recognized as “real Indians,” this by no means settles the matter. People with such (biological) ties can fail to get recognized as a “real Indian,” and people of mixed kinship can be so recognized.

5-Being a “real Indian” is not something one can simply be. Rather, it is something that one becomes in and through the doing of it, that is, in carrying out the actual performance itself. Though one must have certain kinship ties to get in the “game,” beyond this entry criterion, there is no *being* (once and for all) a “real Indian,” rather there is only doing *being-or-becoming-a- “real-Indian.”* If one does not continue to “practice” being a “real Indian,” one ceases to be one

Finally, doing being-and-becoming-a-“real-Indian” is not something that one can do all by oneself. It requires the participation of others. One cannot be a “real Indian” unless one appropriately recognizes “real Indians” and gets recognized by others as a “real Indian” in the practices of doing being-and-becoming-a-“real- Indian.” Being a “real Indian” also requires appropriate accompanying objects (props), times, and places

6-There are a multitude of ways one can do being-and-becoming-a-“real-Indian.” Some of these are (following Wieder and Pratt 1990a): “Real Indians” prefer to avoid conversation with strangers, Native American or otherwise. They cannot be related to one another as

“mere acquaintances,” as some “non-Indians” might put it. So, for “real Indians,” any conversation they do have with a stranger who may turn out to be a “real Indian” will, in the discovery of the other’s “Indianness,” establish substantial obligations between the conversational partners just through the mutual

acknowledgment that they are “Indians” and that they are now no longer strangers to one another. In their search for the other’s “real Indianness” and in their display of their own “Indianness,” “real Indians” frequently engage in a distinctive form of verbal sparring. By correctly responding to and correctly engaging in this sparring, which “Indians” call “razzing,” each participant further establishes cultural competency in the eyes of the other.

lecture six

1-The key to Discourses is “recognition.” If you put language, action, interaction, values, beliefs, symbols, objects, tools, and places together in such a way that others *recognize* you as a particular type of who (identity) engaged in a particular type of what (activity) here and now, then you have pulled off a Discourse (and thereby continued it through history, if only for a while longer).

2- It is sometimes helpful to think about social and political issues as if it is not just us humans who are talking and interacting with each other, but rather, the Discourses we represent and enact, and for which we are “carriers.” The Discourses we enact existed before each of us came on the scene and most of them will exist long after we have left the scene. Discourses, through our words and deeds, carry on conversations with each other through history, and, in doing so, form human history. Think, for instance, of the long-running and ever-changing “conversation” in the U.S. and Canada between the Discourses of “being an Indian” and “being an Anglo” or of the different, but equally long-running “conversation” in New Zealand between “being a Maori” and “being an Anglo” (or, for that matter, think of the long-running conversation between “being a British Anglo” and “being an American Anglo”).

3- Some studies argue the physics experimental physicists “know” is, in large part, *not* in their heads. Rather, it is spread out (distributed), inscribed in (and often trapped in) apparatus, symbolic systems, books, papers, and journals, institutions, habits of bodies, routines of practice, and other people (Latour 1987; Traweek 1988).

4- The notion of Discourses will be important throughout this book. It is important, therefore, to make some points clear to avoid some common misunderstandings. Imagine I freeze a moment of thought, talk, action, or interaction for you, in the way in which a projector can freeze a piece of film. To make sense of that moment, you have to recognize the identities and activities involved in it

Perhaps, for this frozen moment you can't do so, so you move the film back and forward enough until you can make such a recognition judgment. "Oh, now I see," you say, "it's a 'real Indian' razzing another 'real Indian'," or "it's a radical feminist berating a male for a crass male remark" or "it's a laboratory physicist orienting colleagues to a graph" or "it's a first-grader in Ms. X's class starting a sharing time story."

5- This is what I call "recognition work." People engage in such work when they try to make visible to others (and to themselves, as well) who they are and what they are doing

6- There is another term that it is useful in place of the cumbersome phrase "whodoing- what," at least as far as the *language* aspects of "who-doing-whats" are concerned (remembering that language is caught up with "other stuff" in Discourses). This term is "social language" (Gee 1996: ch. 4; Bakhtin 1986). Each of the *who-doing-whats* we saw on the aspirin bottle is linguistically expressed in different "social languages." All languages, like English or French, are composed of many (a great many) different social languages. Social languages are what we learn and what we speak

lecture 7

2.8 Two grammars

1- Each social language has its own distinctive grammar. However, two different sorts of grammars are important to social languages, only one of which we ever think to study formally in school. One grammar is the traditional set of units like nouns, verbs, inflections, phrases and clauses. These are real enough, though quite inadequately described in traditional school grammars. Let's call this "grammar one."

The other – less studied, but more important – grammar is the "rules" by which grammatical units like nouns and verbs, phrases and clauses, are used to create *patterns* which signal or "index" characteristic *whos-doing-whats-within- Discourses*. That is, we speakers and writers design our oral or written utterances to have patterns in them in virtue of which interpreters can attribute situated identities and specific activities to us and our utterances. We will call this "grammar two."

2- Let me give a couple of examples from Gee of social languages at work, beyond the example of the two different social languages in the warning on the aspirin bottle, examples Gee has used over the years as particularly clear instances of different social languages (e.g. Gee 1996). Consider, for instance, the following case of an upper-middle-class, Anglo-American young woman named "Jane," in her twenties, who was attending one of the author (Gee) courses on language and communication

The course was discussing different social languages and, during the discussion, Jane claimed that she herself did not use different social languages in different contexts, but rather, was consistent from context to context. In fact, to do otherwise, she said, would be “hypocritical,” a failure to “be oneself.” In order to support her claim that she did not switch her style of speaking in different contexts and for different conversational partners, Jane decided to record herself talking to her parents and to her boyfriend. In both cases, she decided to discuss a story the class had discussed earlier, so as to be sure that, in both contexts, she

was talking about the same thing. In the story, a character named Abigail wants to get across a river to see her true love, Gregory. A river boat captain (Roger) says he will take her only if she consents to sleep with him. In desperation to see Gregory, Abigail agrees to do so. But when she arrives and tells Gregory what she has done, he disowns her and sends her away. There is more to the story, but this is enough for our purposes here. Students in my class had been asked to rank order the characters in the story from the most offensive to the least. In explaining to her parents why she thought Gregory was the worst (least moral) character in the story, the young woman said the following:

Well, when I thought about it, I don’t know, it seemed to me that Gregory should be the most offensive. He showed no understanding for Abigail, when she told him what she was forced to do. He was callous. He was hypocritical, in the sense that he professed to love her, then acted like that.

Earlier, in her discussion with her boyfriend, in an informal setting, she had also explained why **she thought Gregory was the worst character. In this context she said:**

What that guy was, you know, her boyfriend. I should hope, if I ever did that to see you, you would shoot the guy. He uses her and he says he loves her. Roger never lies, you know what I mean?

It was clear – even to Jane – that she had used two very different forms of language. The differences between Jane’s two social languages are everywhere apparent in the two texts. To her parents, she carefully hedges her claims (“I don’t know,” “it seemed to me”); to her boyfriend, she makes her claims straight out

To her boyfriend, she uses terms like “guy,” while to her parents she uses more formal terms like “offensive,” “understanding,” “callous,” “hypocritical” and “professed.” She also uses more formal sentence structure to her parents (“it seemed to me that . . . ,” “He showed no understanding for Abigail, when . . . ,” “He was hypocritical in the sense that . . .”) than she does to her boyfriend (“. . . that guy, you know, her boyfriend,” “Roger never lies, you know what I mean?”). Jane repeatedly addresses her boyfriend as “you,” thereby noting his social involvement as a listener, but does not directly address her parents in this way

In talking to her boyfriend, she leaves several points to be inferred, points that she spells out more explicitly to her parents (e.g. her boyfriend must infer that Gregory is being accused of being a hypocrite from the information that though Roger is bad, at least he does not lie, which Gregory did in claiming to love Abigail). All in

all, Jane appears to use more “school-like” language to her parents. Her language to them requires less inferencing on their part and distances them as listeners from social and emotional involvement with what she is saying, while stressing, perhaps, their cognitive involvement and their judgment of her and her “intelligence.” Her language to her boyfriend, on the other hand, stresses social and affective involvement, solidarity, and co-participation in meaning making. This young woman is making visible and recognizable two different versions of *who* she is and *what* she is doing. In one case she is “a dutiful and intelligent daughter having dinner with her proud parents” and in the other case she is “a girl friend being intimate with her boyfriend.”